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“Compared with this method of solving the economic
problem by means of decentralisation plus automatic
co-ordination, the more obvious method of central direc-
tion is incredibly clumsy, primitive and limited in scope.”
Friedrich Hayek (1944: 37)
“For simplicity let me describe how to attack the prob-
lem for a given political party… the expert [economist/
econometrician] will go back to his electronic computer
in which he had already entered the data regarding the
core of the economy. To this he will now add the for-
malization of the preferences in the quantitative form
as he now sees it. From this will come out a solution, 
in the form of an optimal development path for the
economy.”
Ragnar Frisch (1970: 31-32)
INTRODUCTION
O
ptimism is a strange topic for an economist, a
practitioner of a science perceived to be so pecu-
liarly dismal that even the grave does not evoke sympa-
thy; as Walter Bagehot observed a long time ago, “the
public has never yet been sorry to hear of the death of
an economist”.1 Yet, not long after Bagehot’s observa-
tion an economist of rising reputation mentioned that a
great teacher of his, an economist of widespread and
lasting fame, said “if he had seven sons they should all
study economics”.2 Such optimism, at least in a tem-
pered version, is encountered frequently enough within
economics and I have chosen to speak about two tradi-
tions that support these optimisms. 
In one of these traditions, I speculate, optimism is
based on the comprehension of a spontaneous (and
often progressive) order in a decentralised (or market)
economy – what I will call the optimism of the “invisible
hand”. Paradoxically, it is this optimistic tradition that
earned economics the label of “dismal science” from the
pen of Thomas Carlyle. Since the story of this insult is
both interesting and relevant to the topic at hand I will
summarise it briefly. 
Until recently an author of considerable authority3
could claim that Carlyle had called economics the “dis-
mal science” upon reading the grim Malthusian predic-
tions of population growth outstripping the expansion
of the food supply. Others have found in economics a
“dismal science” which incessantly studies the trade-offs
between competing wants and needs; trade-offs
required by the limited means at the disposal of each
decision-maker. “We have been turned out of Para-
dise”, as Lionel Robbins (1932 [1962]: 15) said; “we
have neither eternal life nor unlimited means of gratifi-
cation” and the unity of our subject matter lies in this
dismal state of affairs. 
More recent scholarship has, however, brought into
question these widely held explanations for Carlyle’s
insult. David Levy and Sandra Peart have recently
argued that the original context in which Carlyle
labelled economics the “dismal science” was the strug-
gle to end slavery in the British Empire (Levy, 2001;
Levy and Peart, 2001). And what made economics so
dismal was the economist’s optimism that emancipated
slaves, since they share our common humanity, would
be quite capable of living lives of virtue and prosperity
without the paternalistic hands of their owners.4 Of
course this only sounds dismal to those, like Carlyle and
Ruskin, who fancied for themselves a greater role in
guiding the inferior slave races to gainful labour and,
perhaps, civilisation. Only a “dismal science”, cried
Carlyle, “…finds the secret of this Universe in ‘supply
and demand’, and reduces the duty of human governors
to that of letting men alone” (Carlyle, 1849 [1897]: 353-
354).
But there was more to the economist’s optimism
for emancipated slaves than the doctrine of the “rights
of man”; there was also a conception of society in which
the actions of each, focussed as they are on needs and
benefits perceived by the decision-maker and informed
by her information set and budget constraints, serve the
needs of others – as if guided by an invisible hand – in a
complex and spontaneous order that is the result of
human decisions but not of human design. We must
look here – at the theory of spontaneous order – for
the wellspring of one tradition of optimism in econom-
ics. 
Against the optimism of the invisible hand stands
another optimistic tradition in economics, whereby we
might take courage from our ability to do right by soci-
ety through instructing governments to cut the Gordian
knot of market relations with the keen edge of our
most enlightened plans. I will use “rationalism”, or more
precisely “constructivist rationalism”,5 for optimism of
this second kind. The tension between these two
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4groups of optimists runs through the history of eco-
nomic thought and both groups include leading econo-
mists in their ranks, as indicated by the two quotations
from two Nobel laureates at the heading of this lecture.
I contrasted the views of two Nobel laureates to
avoid the impression that this is mainly an ideological
divide. The difference is, I believe, a theoretical one and
my view and yours should consequently be open to per-
suasion when confronted with objections of logic and
the force of evidence. I will use an example from con-
temporary policy-making in South Africa to contrast the
optimisms of the invisible hand and of rationalism. And
I will argue that the expected outcomes of policies
based on these contrasting theories are likely to differ
sharply, and that transformation as I understand it, is
consistent with one of these theories and not the other.
ORDER, OPTIMISM AND 
TRANSFORMATION
L
et me start with a small amount of housekeeping on
the terminology concerning three concepts: opti-
mism, order and transformation. By optimism I do not
mean the Panglossian doctrine, associated with Leibniz,
that ours is the “best of all possible worlds”, nor do I
mean the doctrine that some conception of the “good”
will ultimately triumph over “evil”. By optimism I mean
the expectation that, whatever our present troubles,
our society has the capacity for improvement to meet
these challenges. It is the kind of optimism found in the
work of Karl Popper (for example, Popper, 1997).  
The optimism described above was about society,
and that is also the reason for defining order as patterns
of behaviour by individuals in a society which are mutu-
ally consistent to such an extent that each person is able
to pursue her several goals. Such order requires a high-
ly successful co-ordinating mechanism, and it is about
the nature of this mechanism that the two traditions of
optimism discussed here will part ways. The two tradi-
tions I have chosen for my topic express two views on
the order we observe in society, a distinction that will
not only trace a fault-line through the history of eco-
nomics between spontaneous (grown) order and ratio-
nal (made) order. This same fault-line runs though many
other social sciences. 
The focus on order is necessary to sustain the opti-
mism of either tradition. Optimism implies an expecta-
tion of a better future and it is only in a social order that
a person might find the unfolding events consistent with
her expectations (whether optimistic or pessimistic). By
implication, the analysis precludes revolutions, of which
it was said by Kolakowski (1979 [1990]: 219) that they
are “spontaneous processes in the course of which the
institutions of power disintegrate through the participa-
tion of the great masses of society”. One cannot form
expectations about revolutions; though, of course, one
might hope. Instead I will focus more narrowly on those
configurations of society where “optimism” is an appro-
priate noun. 
The position I have taken on “optimism” and
“order” already suggests some limits on what I might
reasonably mean with “transformation”. It cannot be
revolutionary, and it has to be forward-looking and con-
sistent with optimistic expectations. In a recent lecture
on the concept of a transformative Constitution, held at
this university, Chief Justice Langa argued that on one
reading “Transformation … is a social and economic
revolution” (Langa, 200: 3). I have already argued that I
am going to put such revolutionary doctrines to one
side in this discussion. But the Chief Justice also re-
ferred to the argument of my colleague in Public Law at
this University, Andre van der Walt, who tries to dis-
suade us from seeing transformation as a process that
“merely moved the battlefield of revolutionary struggle
to the courtroom of constitutional due process” (Van
der Walt, 2001: 295). He invites us to imagine that
“there might be further options and more complex
alternatives to the two places between which we have
chosen” (Van der Walt, 2001: 29). This understanding
contrasts transformation not with “preservation” but
with “transition”, and it will allow us to talk about the
process of such change as envisioned by the two theo-
ries under consideration. 
From this I suggest the following outline: transfor-
mation in South Africa is the progressive process
whereby the social order changes and becomes more
inclusive over time, without fixing on a particular con-
figuration for the “transformed” society along any of the
potential fault-lines in society, such as race, gender and
class and without trading off gains by some against loss-
es by others. I do not prejudge the form this process
should take, though this lecture is meant to inform that
discussion. I do, however, reject explicitly the sharp
contrast that is often drawn when the role of the
Constitution in transformation is discussed, between
“preservative” and “transformative” constitutions (for
example, Sunstein, 2001). In this distinction a transfor-
mative constitution is assumed to mean that the power
of the state be used to shape the distribution of prop-
erty directly on the argument that transformation
would be unlikely without such interventions (Davis,
2003). The latter may be true, but should not be
5assumed without studying the process of economic
change and the role of constitutions in it more closely. 
Allow me an example from my own field of macro-
economics to illustrate the debate between proponents
of these two types of optimism in public policy.
Sweden’s monetary system was under severe pressure
in 1931, as the Krona suffered speculative attacks in the
wake of Britain moving off the gold standard in
September of that year (Berg and Jonung, 1998). The
government of the day turned to Swedish economists
for advice, especially Cassel and Heckscher, who sug-
gested a new framework for monetary policy organised
around an explicit target for the price level, as their pre-
decessor, Wicksell, had proposed some thirty years
earlier (Bäckström, 199). This view places a limit on the
policy discretion of the Central Bank, and is based on
the optimistic expectation that the market economy
would provide for a general increase in prosperity, if the
monetary system provided a stable backdrop for mar-
ket exchanges, and that the exercise of monetary dis-
cretion would often be destabilising. I have argued else-
where (Du Plessis, 2005b) that the modern cousin of
the price level target, the inflation target as implement-
ed in South Africa, shares many of the desirable features
of the former system. 
I want to emphasise that this was not “conservative”
policy advice, if “conservative” means obstructing
change or expressing some longing for a past order or
for preserving some conception of the status quo distri-
bution of income and wealth (see also, Hayek, 1960).
And it was a success: the price level stabilised and
Sweden was spared the worst of the recession, which
had, especially in the USA, been associated with grave
mistakes by monetary policy-makers (Friedman and
Schwartz, 193; Mundell, 2000) – mistakes which would
probably not have been made under a price-level target.
In 1937 the price-level target came up for evalua-
tion, and though it received a favourable review from a
panel of economists, a group of young economists,
including Ohlin and Myrdal, turned the public debate in
favour of a more ambitious role for monetary policy
(Berg and Jonung, 1998). These economists were opti-
mistic too, but based their optimism on a very different
model of the economy and of the role of monetary pol-
icy: the economy was depressingly unstable, but econo-
mists – who understand the malaise – might wield the
tools of policy, like engineers or dentists as Keynes
(1931) would famously have it, to correct these faults
and restore the optimism.
But in Sweden during the thirties the results were
less commendable. There, as elsewhere, removing lim-
its to the discretion on monetary policy-makers had
unfortunate consequences. Sweden was not spared the
sustained inflation which affected market economies in
the post-War era, and which can plausibly be connect-
ed to a mistaken model of the economy in which mon-
etary policy plays an expanded role.6 Once lost, it
would take sixty years, and a switch to inflation-target-
ing, for the kind of monetary stability to return which
they had enjoyed between 1931 and 1937.
RATIONALISM: A FIRST 
OPTIMISTIC TRADITION
T
he optimistic tradition that I will call “rationalism”
has ancient roots reaching back at least to the
Greek philosophers of the first millennium BC, espe-
cially to Plato. A critical distinction underlies much of
this tradition, i.e. the distinction between “natural” and
“social” regularities, where the latter is the result of
deliberate human design and the former should be
regarded as given and immutable. This was not usually
an optimistic tradition, as it often regarded the “social”
regularities as a degenerative version of an earlier more
robust state, or of some ideal state, as with Plato’s
Republic (Popper, 1966). Not surprisingly this tradition
was often profoundly conservative, and it was only in
the 17
th
century, but especially during Enlightenment of
the 18
th
century, that it received an optimistic refor-
mulation. From Descartes onwards an important line of
Western thinkers – including especially Rousseau, the
Encyclopaedists and Comte – argued that, if people had
designed some of the important institutions in society,
people might also change them and that Reason might
guide their reforming hands. It is this optimistic version
of rationalism that Hayek calls Cartesian or
Constructivist rationalism (Hayek, 1945 [1984]-a,
1988). 
Descartes was, for example, much impressed by the
constitution of ancient Sparta, especially since it was the
design of a single mind (Hayek, 1945 [1984]-a). But
more interesting for my purpose is that the first school
of economists, the Physiocrats of the 18th century, stand
in this tradition. They – like so many progressive
thinkers of their province and time – were enthusiastic
proponents of the Natural Law, especially of the branch
that argued for the application of Natural Law reason-
ing to society7 (Gide and Rist, 1964). The various
Natural Law doctrines shared three main themes
(Berlin, 1997: 171). First, they conceived of a distinct
“human nature” which could, in principle, be under-
stood. Second, this human nature implied certain spe-
cific human goals following from the very design of the
human being by an impersonal nature, or God. And,
finally, these goals were harmonious between people
and with the laws governing nature. Such assumptions
might yield a model of the natural social order to the
talented theorist, and that is precisely what the Tableau
Économique did for the leading Physiocrat, Dr Quesnay.
I have tried to construct a fundamental Tableau of the
economic order for the purpose of displaying ex-
penditure and products in a way which is easy to grasp,
and for the purpose of forming a clear opinion about
the organisation and disorganisation which government
can bring about… you have seen the tableau in these
days - it is a way of meditating on the present and on
the future.8
These were optimistic insights, but also centralising, as
a prominent Physiocrat, Le Mercier de la Rivière
explained: “the despotism of the laws and the personal
despotism of the lawgiver are one and same: that of the
irresistible power of evidence” (quoted in Berlin, 1997:
173). Though they respected liberty and wanted to
extend the scope of free initiative, especially in eco-
nomic matters, they also argued that the informed exer-
cise of freedom by the citizens will, necessarily, co-ordi-
nate with the plans of an enlightened ruler. 
“The problem” for the Physiocrats, said Lord Acton
(2000: 10), “is to enlighten the ruler, not to restrain
him”. In the dark years leading up to the French Revo-
lution these economists, impressed as they were with
the immense social problems of their day, reasoned that
though society was in no position to recover under its
own steam, the government which had ruined it might
still recover its prosperity. They stood ready “to undo
the work of absolutism by the hand of absolutism…
Transformation, infinitely more difficult in itself than
preservation, was not more formidable to the econo-
mists because it consisted mainly in revoking the god-
less work of a darker age” (Acton, 2000: 11).
A contemporary South African will be struck by the
following familiar themes from the story of the Physio-
crats: the appreciation of immense social problems; the
clear understanding that a former government was
responsible for all these problems; the doubt that soci-
ety would be dynamic enough to meet these challenges
without government taking the leading role in trans-
forming society; and, finally, the conclusion that to effect
such transformation, government must not be re-
strained, as would perhaps have been wise if the needs
of society were simply preservative. We will encounter
these ideas again below. 
These Physiocratic doctrines, with their unhappy
consequences in France, did not, however, enter the
main line of economic thinking, which at that time was
already developing in Scotland. Throughout the 19
th
century the idea of a rational reordering of society
based on the study of economics was kept alive by var-
ious socialist thinkers, for example Saint Simon, but our
interest lies in the emergence of this rationalism in the
mainstream of economics during the 1930s. 
The Great Depression of the early thirties dealt a
tremendous blow to the public’s confidence in a decen-
tralised or market-based society across the industri-
alised world, especially in England, but also in America.
Leading English economists, such as John Maynard
Keynes, no longer believed in the efficacy of the mar-
ket’s self-correcting mechanism (Keynes, 1936). He
thundered that economists, who were confident that
the hard times would eventually pass, had set them-
selves a useless task when they might be assisting the
recovery in the short run (Keynes, 1923). For example,
he wrote to Hayek to congratulate him on his book The
Road to Serfdom (1944) and to share his agreement with
much of the analysis (see the letter in Harrod’s (1972
[1951]) biography of Keynes). Yet, from the same
premises Keynes concluded more or less the opposite,
i.e. “what we want is not no planning, or even less plan-
ning, indeed I should say that we almost certainly want
more planning”. 
The root of their disagreement was Keynes’s rejec-
tion of Hayek’s assumption of divergent ends: his argu-
ment was that the latter would be addressed by restor-
ing “right moral thinking”, since “dangerous acts can be
done safely in a community which thinks and feels right-
ly, which would be the way to hell if they were execut-
ed by those who think and feel wrongly.” If harmonised
morally, society would be in a position to enjoy the
“fruits” of planning, as Keynes called it. Contra Keynes,
Hayek (1973) has - with respect to the coercive power
of government - insisted that “it will certainly remain
an exceedingly dangerous power so long as we believe
that it will do harm only if wielded by bad men.”
Keynesianism was an important, but not the only,
avenue along which constructivist rationalism re-
entered economic thinking during the thirties and espe-
cially the post-War period. Economic theory received a
formalisation and an extension to welfare economics
from the thirties to the fifties at the hands of the great
theorists Samuelson, Hicks, Arrow, Debreu and others. 
Amongst these theoretical advances was the discov-
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ery that the actual economy differed in many respects
from the idealised economies in our models, where
assumptions about “perfect competition” and the ratio-
nality of the model’s actor, “economic man”, had deliv-
ered such encouraging results in the hands of the old
masters (Chamberlin, 1933; Robinson, 1933). In these
theories competition was thought to be a matter of
market structure, essentially the number and size of
firms involved in markets, and market failure seemed to
be an ever-present danger if actual markets fell short, as
they more or less have to, from the infinitely dispersed
market structure of the formal theory (Stigler, 1988).
Nor was monopoly the only pathology of modern
industrialised economies; externalities also caused mar-
kets to fail and governments had assumed the task of
stabilising economic fluctuations (Tanzi, 1997).
Meanwhile the econometric society was founded in
the early thirties and the first macroeconomic models
appeared just before World War II. These models
promised to guide the hands of governments as they
wrestled with the many shortcomings that economists
were discovering in the market economy. The quota-
tion by Ragnar Frisch – a leading econometrician of that
era, and the first winner of the Nobel prize in econom-
ics, jointly with Jan Tinbergen – shows the optimism of
that generation of constructivist rationalists. Frisch
emphasises the role of the econometric model, which
adequately captures the dynamic structure of the econ-
omy, the formalisation of the political preferences and
the optimality of the answer which the computer would
yield in the hands of the skilful expert. 
Frisch’s quotation is a little outrageous and it risks
creating the impression that modern theory and econo-
metrics have been misguided. They have not. What is
misguided is the belief that they offer a comprehensive
or uniquely correct way of seeing the economy, the
modernist belief that they “got it right”. Modernism has
its limitations in economics too, especially when theo-
retical or econometric overconfidence is joined by what
McCloskey (2001) calls the “Promethean illusion” of
social engineering or the “fatal conceit” as Hayek (1988)
called it. And economists have discovered the same in
various fields since the seventies: in econometrics
(Lucas, 1976; Hendry, 1980; Leamer, 1983), in policy-
modelling (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and
Gordon, 1983; Taylor, 1993), from experience with pol-
icy-making (Tanzi, 1997; Fischer, 2005; Tanzi, 2005),
with development assistance (Easterly, 2001) and with
the help of experimental economics (Smith, V. L., 2003). 
For these, and many other reasons,9 social engineer-
ing has since acquired a bad odour and the leading econ-
omists of our time would not lightly follow Frisch in
referring to themselves as “econometricians and social
engineers” (for example, Frisch, 1970: 24). Even Jeffrey
Sachs objects to such a characterisation of the Big Push
– a plan to end world poverty consisting of 54 points, all
of which have to be implemented simultaneously (Sachs,
2005) – as “top down” planning or social engineering. 
Though considerably less important in mainstream
economic thinking at this time, constructivist rationality
in economics still plays an important role in our domes-
tic policy discussion. A recent and high-profile case was
government’s fundamental regulatory overhaul of the
pharmaceutical industry based on the Medicines Act of
1997. I am going to highlight one specific regulation that
has received widespread media attention and which will
affect all of our lives, i.e. the decision to implement price
controls on medicines and scheduled substances sold in
South Africa. 
It is also an instructive example, because the moti-
vation for the regulation and its design fit the tradition
of constructivist rationalism that I have been discussing.
Furthermore, the legal trail in a succession of courts,
ultimately ending in the Constitutional Court, gives us
the benefit of the extensive judgements of the Con-
stitutional Court from which we can learn about the
Constitutional implications of such regulations in South
Africa and about the analytical tools used by the judges
on the Constitutional bench.
A short summary of the regulations follows. The
Department of Health convened a pricing committee to
decide on a dispensing fee for medicines by pharmacies
in South Africa. These regulations are intended to give
effect to the goals in the National Drug Policy to lower
the cost of medicine in the country and to encourage
“cost effective and rational use of drugs” (Minister of
Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 202). At the
same time the Department of Health is using this regu-
lation to encourage changes to the business models of
pharmacies in this country towards becoming an indus-
try with fewer pharmacies using fewer pharmacists and
more assistants. In the Department of Health’s view this
regulation will enhance the access to health care in this
country, which is a constitutionally protected social and
economic right.10
To that end the pricing committee collected infor-
mation about costs and revenues from pharmacies, held
hearings with interested parties and eventually pub-
lished a schedule for dispensing fees. These fees are
understood to be the remuneration for the profession-
al services rendered by the pharmacists, while trading in
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8medicine, i.e. buying medicine at one price and selling it
at another, will now be forbidden. Instead the medicine
must pass at a single price (called the single exit price)
from the manufacturing firm, through the wholesale and
retail chains, to the final consumer. The Department of
Health believes that the dispensing fees are adequate to
ensure the economic survival of pharmacies with a busi-
ness model that matches the Department’s conception
of efficiency (Tshabalala-Msimang, 2006). Though the
Department believes that some pharmacies will close or
merge with other pharmacies following these regula-
tions, the Department does not fear that the availability
of medicine might be impaired through the conse-
quences of price regulation and its possible impact on
the viability of pharmacies; nor is the Department con-
cerned about the fate of the pharmacies as such. 
A broad alliance of pharmacies objected to these re-
gulations in court, ending ultimately in the Constitu-
tional Court. The Constitutional Court ruled that the
price regulations as such were “coherent” and consis-
tent with the Medicines Act of 1997, and that they
would serve the important constitutional principle men-
tioned above. But the Court found the precise dispens-
ing fee inadequately justified, and also ruled that the spe-
cial position of rural and courier pharmacies have to be
taken into account in a revision of the pricing scheme
(Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 13). 
This is not the place to comment on the merits of
the judgement from a legal perspective and I am cer-
tainly not the person to do so. So I will restrict my com-
ments to the following economic issues raised by the
judges: 
1. A first issue is the matter of compensation for phar-
macies. There was widespread agreement amongst
the judges that the regulations would adversely
affect the pharmacies.11 And though the Court paid
lip service the interest of the pharmacies, they
offered no compensation for what is a reasonably
clear-cut regulatory taking.12 Ngobo sees, for exam-
ple, that “No doubt the interests of the pharmacists
is a factor to be taken into consideration”, but he
proceeds immediately with the dismissal “However,
they must yield to the interests of the general pub-
lic” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others,
2006: 519).
2. The Constitutional Court regarded the appropriate
dispensing fee as an objective matter.13
3. The third issue was raised by Justices Sachs and
Moseneke. Sachs argued that “the mere fact that a
government measure could result in service-
providers losing their competitive edge so as to face
being driven out of business, would not in itself be
enough to make a measure legally inappropriate
(unreasonable). The maintenance of ‘business as
usual’ is not a constitutional principle, and the con-
cept of reasonableness should not be used as an
apparently neutral instrument which, regarding the
status quo as the settled norm, serves to block
transformation and freeze challengeable aspects of
our public life” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and
others, 2006: 660).
I will start with the last issue, the argument by Sachs: “In
a society where distributions are manifestly unequal and
unjust, it is a defence of the status quo and the failure to
make corrective intervention, rather than a re-distribu-
tive initiative, that could be open to a charge of unrea-
sonableness.”14 Justice Sachs backed his argument with
extracts from the book by the American jurist, Cass
Sunstein The Partial Constitution (Sunstein, 1993). 
There, as elsewhere, Sunstein argues that the pro-
tection of property rights (or other legal entitlements,
or wealth, etc.) should not be seen as neutral, and the
violation of these rights by government should not per-
force be seen as partial or inappropriate. The existing
distribution of rights and wealth and income are all a
result of the law (Sunstein, 1993: 4-5) and he admires
the insight of the New Deal Court and President
Roosevelt in particular for grasping that “We must lay
hold of the fact that economic laws are not made by
nature. They are made by human beings” (Roosevelt,
quoted in Sunstein, 1993: 58). 
Following Roosevelt – and the long line of this tradi-
tion back to the early Greek philosophers – Sunstein
argues that since social problems, such as poverty, can-
not have been caused by nature, they must result from
human design. Since poverty is the “product of the law”,
while the law is in turn the product of the state,
Sunstein concludes: “We should agree that poverty is in
some sense a creation of the state” (Sunstein, 1993:
155).
Before I take issue with this claim, let me recapitu-
late the rationalist case for optimism in economics,
which is also shared by Sunstein (from a Public Law per-
spective). The argument is that there are two types of
regularities, natural regularities and those regularities
caused by human design, call them social regularities.
The social ills of our society are almost certainly not
due to nature, so they must be social regularities. If
human design – whether expressed through economic
laws or legal entitlements – is the cause of social ills,
then we could use the sciences of economics and of the
law to reform the existing order and so remove the
social ills. 
THE INVISIBLE HAND: A SECOND
OPTIMISTIC TRADITION
T
he second optimistic tradition in economics, which
Pete Boettke has called the main line of economic
thought, objects to the very first step of Sunstein’s chain
of reasoning: that there are only two categories of reg-
ularities, those due to nature and those due to deliber-
ate design. Adam Smith and the other leading figures of
the Scottish Enlightenment (David Hume, Adam
Ferguson, Thomas Reid, Sir James Steuart and John
Millar) argued that there is yet a third category, regu-
larities which are the result of human action, but not of
deliberate design (Robertson, 1987). 
The existing distribution of property, wealth and
income in society, as well as prices, fall into this catego-
ry. It is not logically necessary for a state or even law to
exist as a condition for the existence of property
(Nozick, 1974). But you don’t have to agree with the
abstract point, as Sunstein’s claim is also false historical-
ly. Economists have catalogued many different non-state
institutions that emerged to serve the protection of
property rights: for example, coalitions of Maghribi
traders of the 11th century (Greif, 1993), Champagne
fairs of the 12th and 13th centuries (Greif, 1993), the
17th-century Bourse in Amsterdam15 (Greif, 2005), the
Commune of Genoa (Greif, 2005), and cattlemen’s
associations, land clubs and mining districts in the
American West (Smith, V. L., 2003) to name but a few.
Not only were there many alternatives to legally
enforceable property rights with state backing, but
there was also, historically, considerable competition
between different systems of contract enforcement.
The observed efficiency of the common law has been
explained by, for example Rubin (2005), as the result of
a rivalrous competition between competing enforce-
ment mechanisms such as the ecclesiastical courts and
the civil courts, and within the latter between royal, feu-
dal, manorial, urban and mercantile law. This turns the
table on Sunstein’s argument: historically and logically,
the common law developed in response to, and evolved
with, the needs of the expanding market. 
It was the great discovery of the Scottish En-
lightenment that a spontaneous social order, and not
unavoidable chaos, could emerge together with a set of
institutions that enforce contracts and protect a private
sphere of control, as indeed had happened historically16
(Coase, 1937). The quotation from Hayek that I placed
at the top of this text summarises this penetrating,
though counterintuitive, idea. A decentralised economy
works by allowing individuals to specialise on their own
initiative and then to provide for the remainder of their
needs through exchange. However, decentralised order
requires, at a minimum, secure property rights and an
extravagant amount of information. It was not in the
tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment to solve this
problem of information by assuming ‘perfect’ knowl-
edge either for individuals, or for some social planner.
Rather, the emphasis was on people’s epistemological
limitations. For Hayek (1945 [1984]-a) this modest view
of human capacity, or what he calls the “constitutional
limitations of man’s knowledge and interests, the fact
that he cannot know more than a tiny part of the whole
society and that therefore all that can enter into his
motives are the immediate effects which his actions will
have in the sphere he knows”, is the central problem in
economics. 
Co-operation between people in such an order
leads a person, or group, in Smith’s famous argument,
“by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no
part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for
society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own
interest he frequently promotes that of society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it”
(Smith, A., 1776 [1981]: 456). 
The “invisible hand”17 is a metaphor for the co-ordi-
nating mechanism of a decentralised society and it
refers to the feedback mechanism, often prices, but
sometimes quantities too, that signal to the participants
whether their decisions and expectations are consistent
with the decisions and expectations of others (Barry,
1982). And these signals are usually generated under the
pressure of competition, where competition is the rival-
rous process of “decentralised planning by separate per-
sons” (Hayek, 1945 [1984]-b: 79). The contrast is not
between a planned economy and an unplanned econo-
my, but between comprehensive plans and what Coase
(1991 [1994]) called “areas of planning” embedded in a
complex market. Firms are such “areas of planning” and
exist partly to overcome transactions costs. A sponta-
neous order society is one where the actions of these
areas of planning are coordinated even though none of
the planners can conceive of the order in advance. 
For Adam Smith the division of labour, which entails
specialisation and trade, was key to the progressive
expansion of a spontaneous order society. Hayek (1936
[1984]; 1945 [1984]-b) and more recently North (2005)
have argued that the division of labour is really a special
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case of the more general division of knowledge, which
is the fundamental problem to be solved by a social
order.18 It is the price mechanism and the institutional
matrix which, in a competitive market, solves the infor-
mation problem to a satisfactory extent19 and provides
the incentives for using that information (Hayek, 1945
[1984]-b; Wagner, 1993). On this view “the market” is
the institutional framework, or network of links, within
which voluntary exchange manifests itself (Buchanan,
1999 [1964]). And competition is the means by which
information is acquired and disseminated along this net-
work (Hayek, 1946 [1984]). 
Competition means something very different in this
context than it had done in the discussion of the ratio-
nalist tradition in economics. The competition that
moves the invisible hand – and co-ordinates the sponta-
neous order – is a rivalrous process and not much relat-
ed to market structure, i.e. the number of firms in a
market and their relative sizes (Hayek, 1946 [1984]). In
the invisible hand tradition competition is a behavioural
concept, which McNulty (1967) has suggested we might
associate with the verb “to compete” (see also, Hayek,
1946 [1984]). In contrast, competition in the rationalist
tradition refers to market structure and has no behav-
ioural content.
However, to compete in the older sense of the word
requires institutions – or rules of the game (North,
1984, 1990, 1991) – that would help to identify the suc-
cessful strategies in the competition of specialisation and
trade. Such institutions include those required to
enforce contract rights and those required to define and
protect property rights. The latter also implies institu-
tions to limit the scope of the state, even or perhaps
especially where it is charged with the enforcement of
contract and property rights (Greif, 2005). 
Since these rules of the game (institutions) affect the
costs of social interaction, they shape the incentives fac-
ing decision-makers in economics and in politics (North,
1991). For example, an institution like a legal contract
backed by the state – or an entrenched custom of hon-
esty, enforced by social sanction – renders behaviour
more predictable and diminishes the information re-
quirements for a transaction. Likewise, capital becomes
more mobile when local knowledge is no longer essen-
tial for successful transacting, as happens when com-
mercial practices and commercial law become stan-
dardised between societies. 
Some of the critical features of the spontaneous
order society which I have been describing are: the cen-
trality of individual decision-makers that act on local
information and the far-reaching impact of local deci-
sions; a modest view of the capacity of any specific deci-
sion-maker, including politicians and bureaucrats; feed-
back to these decision-makers about their decisions and
plans through a highly non-linear process of competition
in which the price system plays a central role - a
process that disseminates information and co-ordinates
the activities of the many participating decision-makers,
creating a social order as a result of purposeful action
by the participants, even though that order was not
their intention. The order that emerges from such
interaction will be influenced by its history (we call it
path dependence), but not in a linear or otherwise sim-
plistic manner.20
My colleague Basil Moore has recently described
systems that show these characteristics as complex
adaptive systems (Moore, 2006) and there is now an
expanding literature in economics which applies the
insights from complexity theory to social settings
(Hayek, 1974 [1989]; Rosser, 1999). An important
insight of this literature is that the social order, includ-
ing all the transactions in an economic system, is an
emergent property, the features of which cannot be
known in advance. A second insight from this literature
is the difficulty (indeed one could say the impossibility)
that any single decision-maker in such a system would
have to collect sufficient information to mimic the sys-
tem, or to anticipate the unintended consequences of a
system-wide intervention. 
These new insights have helped to revitalises the
invisible hand tradition in economics and have also re-
opened many policy issues (Rosser, 1999). This does
not mean that there is no role for government policy,
or merely a minimalist role: the efficiency of the institu-
tional framework might be greatly affected by govern-
ment, as I had argued above with respect to Sweden’s
monetary policy regime experiments (see also, Du
Plessis, 2005a). And government can sometimes partic-
ipate in a limited way as one of the areas of planning in
the market, for example with the provision of particular
education services. A problem arises however when
government strives for a more comprehensive plan,
especially where this plan undermines the other of areas
of planning in the economy, or when it debilitates the
flow of information.21
To make this less abstract let us return to the exam-
ple of medicine prices. This plan violates both principles
derived above. First, it undermines the areas of planning
we know as private sector pharmacies. Individual deci-
sion-makers can only participate in the competitive
process if they are able to exchange, and that requires
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security of contract and property rights. This speaks
directly to the Constitutional Court’s disregard for the
regulatory taking implied by the price control on medi-
cine: by failing to protect the value of businesses against
regulatory takings, the Court has undermined the very
feedback mechanism which generates the dynamic
capacity of the social order. The complex nature of the
social order requires from the Court that they protect
the private spheres of control of individual decision-
makers, if they wish to take a step in the progressive
direction. It is perhaps counter-intuitive, but in this
sense a “preservative” judgement creates precisely the
dynamic and transformative social order which the
judges have found envisaged in the Constitution (for
example, Langa, 2006).  
Second, substituting the pricing committee for the
price mechanism undermines the flow of information in
the pharmaceuticals market. This committee faces the
task of gathering and then internalising all the informa-
tion held by the separate pharmacies in the country, and
then to reflect this knowledge in the schedule for dis-
pensing fees. This was an objective task in the view of
the Constitutional Court judges. 
Our first concern might involve the sheer volume of
information at stake, but this is only a practical problem
and perhaps with sufficient computing power it might be
resolved, just as Kasparov was eventually beaten in a
standard match by IBM’s Deep Blue. A second concern
is more fundamental: the calculations of the pricing
committee are indeed objective in so far as they try to
calculate a dispensing fee that would allow pharmacies
to earn a reasonable rate of return on invested capital.
But this calculation is the “antithesis of the market func-
tion of price”, in the words of Vernon Smith (2003:
473), since costs and price are subjective variables for
the individual pharmacy, the pricing structure of which
will emerge with the spontaneous order. There is no
one pricing structure that could be appropriate for
many firms, especially not where uniform prices are
enforced (Brancato and Wagner, 2004). 
A further aspect of this problem is that even with
perfect knowledge and even with limitless computing
capacity, the pricing committee could still not mimic the
decentralised system. If the spontaneous order society is
truly a complex adaptive system, then the very configu-
ration of society changes as we follow what we think are
our best strategies, given the knowledge at our disposal
and the goals we wish to pursue. The resulting strategies
are again open to revision as we receive feedback from
our interaction with others and with nature. James
Buchanan has articulated this point more clearly than
most and I find it useful to quote a sentence or two: 
…the ‘order’ of the market emerges only from the
process of voluntary exchange among the participating
individuals. The ‘order’ is, itself, defined as the outcome
of the process that generates it… The potential partic-
ipants do not know until they enter the process what
their own choices will be. 
(Buchanan, 1982 [1999]: 244-245)
The critical distinction that Buchanan (1982 [1999])
wishes to emphasise here, as Hayek (1973) had done
elsewhere, is between “process” and “end-state”. The
“invisible hand” is a process, and we cannot conceptu-
alise how even an omniscient planner could mimic that
process, as the order of the process will only emerge
with the unfolding of the process. It is manifestly not an
“end-state” question that could equally well be solved,
if only we had sufficient information and sufficient com-
puting power. Nor can this process be described as
preservative of the status quo; strictly speaking there is
no status quo in a complex system.
Then plans of constructivist rationalism are always
inadequate, the result of which is not a slightly more
boring version of the dynamic spontaneous order soci-
ety, as I was told as a child. For example, I remember
the probably apocryphal story that in the Soviet Union
everybody had to have the same brand television set.
But this focus on the lack of choice (though true) was
misplaced, since the crucial points were (i) the difficulty
of getting a television set and (ii) the unfortunate habit
of these television sets to explode. Soviet plans were
not a little off, but wildly inadequate (North, 2005). The
following paragraph – an extract from a visitor’s journal
to Poland during the sixties – demonstrates this failure: 
‘The great mistake you Westerners make about us,’
another Polish acquaintance said, ‘is that you think we
are enslaved by a rigidly organised system from which
one cannot escape. But the truth is that there is no real
system. There is a state of continual disorder. Planners
make small miscalculations which lead to enormous
mistakes. And the ordinary man spends a lot of his time
picking his way through the chaos.’
(Pritchett, 1964: 50)
This critical perspective on the task assumed by the
Department of Health’s pricing committee should not
leave the reader pessimistic about the spontaneous
order society or especially about the scope for im-
provement via policy. Such an impression would be
wrong for two reasons: the first is that the spontaneous
order society, or the market economy as we know it, is
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an incredibly dynamic process which has proven to be
highly responsive to the needs of all members of the
society. It is a highly progressive system and the just
more than 200 years of its existence has seen the great-
est material advance in the history of human kind, the
greatest improvement in health and in the broad partic-
ipation of all members of society in these advances. And
these sustained gains are more impressive still when
contrasted with the highly episodic character of growth
and the pervasive material stagnation over all of human
history (Diamond, 1997; Landes, 1998; Maddison,
2002). 
Second, the spontaneous order society is a process
that matches the requirement for transformation that I
mapped out at the start. It is a dynamic process with
feedback that responds much more rapidly and sensi-
tively than we could hope to do through planning. And,
for the first time in human history, the advance of some
do not have to occur at the cost of others (North,
2005); we can conceive of a positive sum game in which
there is considerable scope for helping the previously
disadvantaged by creating equality of opportunity and by
ensuring fair process. The main line of economic
thought which has explored the spontaneous order of a
decentralised society has always been optimistic, and
for good reason. It is only a strong commitment to cen-
tralised or paternalistic interventions, such as Carlyle’s,
that finds the council of economists a dismal science.
CONCLUSION
M
any of us, myself included, look to the future in
this country and on this continent with optimism,
and my lecture was intended to strengthen that opti-
mism, not by saying: look what we can do if only we
unite our resources, thoughts, identities, and plan for
the good of the cause. There is no need to repeat the
usually frustrating and frequently tragic experiments
down that road. Instead I argued that our optimism
should be based on an understanding of the sponta-
neous market order where, sometimes together in larg-
er or smaller groups, and often separately, we pursue
those goals each of us value and so allow ourselves to
be guided by an invisible hand in the service of each
other.
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FOOT NOTES
1 Bagehot’s remark is recorded in Hayek (1944 [1991]: 39).
2 Hayek (1944 [1991]: 35) told this story about the famous late-nineteenth-century economist Carl Menger. 
3 Robert Heilbroner (1953 [1991]).
4 Economists of a liberal persuasion still assume the natual equality of all individuals, as Adam Smith had done (Buchanan,
2005). 
5 Hayek (1988) used the term “constructivist rationalism” for this tradition in economics.
6 Christina and David Romer (2002) discuss the connection between the disappointing consequences of monetary policy dur-
ing the sixties and seventies while policy-makers used what we now know to be a mistaken model of monetary policy’s role
in the economy. The consequences of monetary policy improved notably following the revision of the underlying model of
the economy during the seventies (see also, Friedman, 1977). 
7 Hence the name by which they came to call themselves, Physiocrats, from the Greek physis (natural) and kratos (power).
8 Extract from a letter by Quesnay to his disciple Mirabeau, reproduced in Meek  (1962: 71).
9 Not least of which the ethical concerns which arises from a greatly expanded public sector (Friedman, 1962 [2002]) and
the technological advances which have made many markets more efficient on the one hand and diminished the technological
arguments supporting claims of “natural” monopolies, on the other (Tanzi, 2005).
10 Professor McIntyre, the chairperson of the pricing committee, testified to the Constitutional Court on the justification for
these far-reaching regulations. Her arguments fall within the tradition of constructive rationalism under discussion, i.e. she
compared her analysis of the pharmaceuticals market to some idealised “perfect market” and found, as one would expect,
many discrepancies: there is not “perfect competition”; consumers don’t have “perfect knowledge”; the demand for medi-
cine is “induced” by the supplier and, in any event, the demand for medicine is not price sensitive (Minister of Health v
New Clicks and others, 2006: 730).
Not only are there too many pharmacies in the country (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 372) with
the result that their cost structure is inappropriate, Professor McIntyre also assured the Court that there are too few phar-
macies in the country with the result that their pricing is monopolistic. 
11 Chaskalson found that “The regulation of prices in the disputed regulations adversely affects the rights of pharmacists and
other persons in the pharmaceutical industry” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 121).
Sachs found that “The price tag put on the activity of the pharmacists affects their interest materially adversely and in an
immediately operative way” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 646).
Moseneke found that “At best for the pharmacies the evidence raises the ever-present possibility that the new dispens-
ing fee will exert downward pressure on the profitability of pharmacies and that some whose profit margins are already
low may be forced to close” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 783).
12 Van der Walt (1999) analyses the legal precedents and implications of compensation for regulatory takings in an interna-
tional perspective, while Du Plessis and Du Plessis (2005) use New Institutional Theory to demonstrate the inefficiency of
failing to compensate for such takings.
13 Chaskalson argues that “Although the ‘capped’ fee must be ‘appropriate’, and to that extent is subject to objective criteria,
regulation 5(2)(g) in effect leaves it to the Minister to determine the ‘appropriateness’ of the fee, instead of setting a maxi-
mum itself.”
Ngobo argued that the fee had to be fair to both pharmacists and the public, and added that “its determination requires
a consideration of conflicting interests of the public who are entitled to access to affordable medicines, on the one hand,
and the interests of dispensers who, in terms of the Act, are essential to the public for the supply of medicines and whose
economic viability is implicitly recognised by the Act and is of ‘national importance’, on the other hand” (Minister of Health
v New Clicks and others, 2006: 518).
Sachs argued that “It may be unclear whether the distress of the pharmacists arises from selfinduced [sic] and self-serv-
ing panic, or is based on objective fact” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 663) and added that “It is
important that the evidence be such as to show to all those affected and to the public in general, that the Pricing
Committee has, after diligent enquiry into the basic issues involved and with a reasonably high degree of likelihood in rela-
tion to the material before it, ‘got it right’, or, at the very least, not got it wrong” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and
others, 2006: 665).
14 See Minister of Health v New Clicks and others (2006 at 660, footnote 84).
15 “The Bourse in Amsterdam was the most important and best organised in Europe during the seventeenth century. Yet,
many of the financial instruments traded in it, such as short sales, forward contracts, options, and hypothecation of shares
as collateral, were either in legal limbo or actually illegal. Reputation sustained trade until the time when these instruments
became legal” (Greif, 2005: 752). 
16 The self-regulated order of a decentralised society has variously been called a “spontaneous order” (by Hayek), “ordered
anarchy” (by Buchanan) or the “invisible-hand order” (by Nozick). The common intuition in these terms is that the social
order is not the result of conscious effort by any of its constituent parts (Cunningham, 1979).
17 Smith’s conceptualisation of the spontaneous order society – or the Great Society, as he also called it – stands in a long
tradition of thought that recognised this third category of regularity in society, starting with the 16
th
-century “School of
Salamanca” at the summit of scholastic philosophy (Barry, 1982). After Smith, the crucial figures in this literature were
Menger and Hayek, but also Friedman, Buchanan, Wagner and others in the Public Choice, New Institutional and Chicago
traditions. 
18 Hayek (1936 [1984]: 50) regarded the division of knowledge as the “really central problem of economics as a social sci-
ence” while North (2005: 84) concluded that “Adam Smith’s specialization and division of labour… is really specialization of
knowledge”.
19 Towards the end of his career Paul Samuelson tried to capture what economists had learnt from the lengthy debate
between proponents of decentralised decision-making and those who argued for the “feasibility of socialist rational pricing”
and his conclusion was both gracious (to Hayek, a long-standing academic opponent) and modest (in its claims for the
decentralised system). “Hayek has been persuasive,” Samuelson admitted “in arguing that experience suggests that only with
heavy dependence on market pricing mechanisms can there be realised quasi-efficient and quasi-progressive organisation of
societies involving humans as Darwinian history has bequeathed them” (Samuelson, 1993). 
20 If current decisions have nonlinear and unexpected consequences, it is impossible to map present conditions linearly onto
past decisions. 
21 Wagner (2002) overstates the case when he argues that in a spontaneous order economic policy can only be “constitu-
tive”, i.e. it can change some of the rules of the game (the institutions), but the allocative outcomes will emerge with the
newly constrained system and cannot be anticipated in advance. His claim is correct for comprehensive allocative plans
though and this mirrors Popper’s long-standing argument for piecemeal policy rather than social engineering (Popper,
1961).
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